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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended and Section 78-45-10, Utah
Code Ann.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to apply the
various provisions of UCA 78-45-7.15 (1995) to a divorce that was originally entered in
1996. Specifically, did the trial court abuse its discretion by entering a judgment against
the Appellant to reimburse dental and drug related counseling expenses without
requiring proof that said expenses had actually been paid by the Appellee, contra to
subsection (7) and by refusing to allow the Appellant to claim reimbursement for the
medical and dental insurance premiums he had actually paid to the minor children's
benefit contra to subsection (3) of UCA 78-45-15.
The standard of review for such decisions is an abuse of the court's discretion. Ball v.
Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
ISSUE 2: Whether the trial court erred when it entered an order containing a judgment
that had only been granted subject to the Appellee providing proof of certain payments,
without first having actually received the evidence of such payments.
Was this error continued when the court entered the order over the objection of
the Appellant without conducting any hearing and without entering a decision concerning
the objection to the order.
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The correction of error standard of review applies in the situation because during
the OSC hearing, the trial court was in essence making factual findings based upon the
attorney's representations made to the court, the award of the judgments against the
Appellant by the trial court was akin to a trial court's conclusions of law. When
reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law, appellate courts apply a correction-of-error
standard without any special deference. W. Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v.
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377-78 (Utah 1987).
ISSUE 3: Whether the trial court erred when it entered an order containing a
judgment for attorney's fees before the proof of payment, which was the basis of the
award of fees, was actually produced as demanded from the Appellee by the court.
While the trial court was in essence making findings based upon the attorney's
representations, the award of the judgment for attorney's fees by the court was akin to a
trial court's conclusions of law. When reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law,
appellate courts apply a correction-of-error standard without any special deference. W.
Kane County Special Serv. Dist No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377-78
(Utah 1987).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15. Medical expenses
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of
the minor children be provided by a parent if it is available at a
reasonable cost.
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance
for medical expenses, the court or administrative agency may consider
the:
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(a) reasonableness of the cost;
(b) availability of a group insurance policy;
(c) coverage of the policy; and
(d) preference of the custodial parent.
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-ofpocket costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's
portion of insurance.
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the
premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons
covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of
children in the instant case.
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable
and necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and
copayments, incurred for the dependent children.
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification
of coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services
under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq.,
upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or
before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the
other parent, or the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the
date he first knew or should have known of the change.
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written
verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other
parent within 30 days of payment.
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for
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the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if
that parent fails to comply with Subsections (6) and (7).

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
Rule 11, sub section (b) Representations to court.
By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment
of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery. . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
TO INCLUDE RELEVANT FACTS
The parties were divorced by a decree of the Fourth District Court on February
27, 1996. On June 29, 2001, the Appellant was ordered to appear in the Fourth District
Court by the Appellee's Order to Show Cause. The hearing before Judge Ray Harding
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Jr., concerned the Appellee's claims for reimbursement from the Appellant for drug
related counseling, orthodontic expenses and insurance premiums that provided certain
coverage for the parties' minor children. (Tr. 2 line 15).
With the exception of a few questions asked of Mrs. Larsen by the trial judge,
neither party testified before that court, although Mrs. Larsen had previously filed an
affidavit related to her claims for reimbursement.
The Appellee's attorney presented to the court the Appellee's claims for
reimbursement and represented to the trial court that the expenses related to drug
abuse counseling and orthodontic treatment had been previously paid by the Appellee.
(Tr. 19 lines 1-18).
The Appellant's attorney argued that the parties' divorce decree was subject to
the provisions of UCA 78-45-15. The Appellant claimed that, pursuant to the Code
subsection (3), he should be reimbursed for the insurance premiums he had paid for the
children's benefit and that pursuant to Code subsection (5), he should not be required to
pay for cosmetic orthodontia that his dental insurance would not cover because the
procedures were not "reasonable and necessary."
The Appellant asked the trial court to schedule an evidentiary hearing wherein he
could question the orthodontic treatment provider before the court in order to establish
whether or not the orthodontic treatments that had been provided to the parties' children
had been "reasonable and necessary" procedures. (Tr. 7 Line 15-19).
Appellee's counsel misrepresented to the Court that the decree entered February
27, 1996, was entered prior to the effective date of UCA 78-45-7.15 (the 1995
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amendment was effective May 1, 1995) and then argued that the code did not apply to
this divorce decree. (Tr. 15, line 20 through 16 line 4).
The trial court denied the request for an evidentiary hearing and found that the
orthodontia, in and of itself was contemplated by the divorce decree. (Tr. 21 line 11-13).
The Court, reiterating the Appellee's incorrect representation that this divorce
decree predated the statute, ruled that each parent was responsible to pay their own
insurance premiums (Tr. 20, lines 21-25 and 21 lines 1-2) "because it is not covered by
the decree." (Tr. 22 line 3-4).
The Appellant also objected to reimbursing the Appellee for the orthodontia and
counseling expenses that he believed had never been paid by the Appellee. (Tr. 9 Line
25 though 10 line 5).
It was apparent that the court agreed with the Appellant, that he should not
reimburse that which had never been paid, when the court confirmed a second time with
both the Appellee's counsel and the Appellee herself that she had proof that she had
actually paid the expenses ("pay out of pocket") for which she was claiming
reimbursement. (Tr. 20 line 2-13).
The Court then orally granted a judgement against the Appellant to reimburse the
Appellee for the counseling and orthodontic expenses claimed, subject to the Appellee
providing to the Appellant, within 10 days, proof of her payments for these expenses.
(Tr. 25 Line 4-7).
Some 60 days after the hearing, on about September 7, 2001, the Appellee's
attorney submitted her proposed order to the Court for entry although the Appellee had
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never provided any proof of payments to the Appellant as the Court had mandated. (Tr.
19, line 16).
On about September 5, 2001, the Appellant filed a timely objection to the order
referring to the lack of proof of payment and other content problems and certain
omissions from the order that the Appellant found objectionable. See Addendum pages
1-4.
About 25 days later, on October 1, 2001, the trial court entered the order
containing the judgment against the Appellant, apparently without taking any action
concerning the Appellant's objection to the order as written. No hearing was ever held
and no notice of any decision concerning the objection was ever provided to the
Appellant. See addendum pages 5-7.
The order as entered by the Fourth District Court created a $2,780.75 judgment
in the Appellee's favor against the Appellant for reimbursement of orthodontia and
$337.50 for counseling costs that the Appellee had never paid.
Following a lengthy period of mediation, the Appellee provided to the Appellant a
statement of account concerning the drug related counseling that clearly shows the bill
for the counseling was finally paid by the Appellee on September 12, 2002, more than
one year after she and her counsel assured the trial court that the bill had been paid
prior to June, 2001. See Addendum pages 8 - 1 1 .
Because this counseling bill has finally been paid by the Appellee and she has
received her reimbursement for the $337.50 expense from the Appellant, the problem of
this bogus judgment against the Appellant is now moot.
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However, to this day, no proof of payment has ever been provided by the
Appellee concerning the orthodontia expenses. Therefore a judgment of more than
$2,700.00 for orthodontia still exists against the Appellant which was issued by the trial
court based upon the same false representations made by the Appellee and her attorney
as was the judgment for the counseling.
The October 1, 2001 order which contains the $2,780.75 judgment, gained by
intentional misrepresentation made to the trial court by the Appellee and her attorney
should be stricken by this court so there is no danger of the Appellee attempting to
collect a reimbursement that is not yet due to her.
In addition to the judgment for orthodontia reimbursement, the trial court awarded
the Appellee $244.75 as one half of her attorneys fees. (Tr. 27 line 7-13). The court did
not award one half of the fees because the Appellee did not prevail entirely on her claim
and because the court needed to clarify a provision of the divorce decree. However, the
one half of the fee that was awarded to the Appellee was based upon her receiving
reimbursement for the costs of counseling and orthodontia. These were the only two
issues the Appellee prevailed on during the hearing. The fee award, in turn, was
granted based upon the Appellee's representations to the court which turned out to be
false. That is, the Appellee told the court that she had paid the orthodontia and
counseling bills and that she had proof of such payments. Because neither of these two
representations were true, the award of attorney's fees based upon the false
representations should be also stricken by this Court.
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ARGUMENT

INSURANCE
The trial court did abuse its discretion when it did not effectively apply certain
provisions of UCA 78-45-15 to this decree. This abuse of discretion appears to have
been inadvertent, but the result is the same. (Tr. 20, lines 21-22). Despite the
Appellee's attorney's misstatement of the true situation, and the court's acceptance of
this misconception, this statute, which sets requirements for divorce decrees, clearly
pre-dated the decree in this matter.
This Court has ruled that "if a statutory amendment is deemed procedural or
remedial, then it applies to all actions-those which have accrued or are pending
(pending from time of commencement until final determination), and to future actions."
Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct App. 1998). If this is true of an amendment,
then it is true of the complete statute.
Here, the statute was amended effective May 1, 1995 and the decree was
entered in February, 1996. The decree was subject to the statute. Sub section (3) of
the statute requires each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium
actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance.
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied the Appellant's request to
receive reimbursement for the premiums he had previously paid for his children.
JUDGMENTS FOR EXPENSES
The trial court abused its discretion when it entered an order containing a
judgment against the Appellant without requiring proof of medical expense payments
11

from the Appellee in accordance with UCA 78-45-15 (7) which states ua parent who
incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and payment of
medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment."
Again, it appears the Court intended to comply with the requirement of the statute
when it ordered the Appellee to produce such proof of payment within 10 days.
However, the Court failed its objective when on October 1, 2001, it entered the order
containing the judgments against the Appellant without ever having seen the proof
demanded by the Court.
This failure was intensified by the court's disregard of the Appellant's objection to
the proposed order which specifically complained that no proof of payment had ever
been received even though that had been the order of the court.
Under the provisions of URCP Rule 11, the Appellee's attorney had a duty to
make an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances to insure that the factual
contentions made by the Appellee concerning her previous payment of the dental and
counseling expenses had evidentiary support before she ever drafted and filed the
Order to Show Cause.
That attorney had a continuing duty to insure via reasonable investigation, that
the representations she made to the trial court concerning the availability of receipts for
the Appellee's "paid out of pocket" expenses were true.
The failure of these duties by the Appellee's attorney could be excusable.
However, the intentional acts of this attorney by drafting and submitting the order
containing the judgments for reimbursement to the court without having first complied
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with the trial court's order that such receipts be produced by the Appellee are not
excusable.
It was a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court to enter the order over the
timely objection of the Appellant without having insured the payments claimed by the
Appellee had truly been made.
The remedy available to this court is to strike the Order containing the judgments
that were gained via misrepresentation to the trial court by the Appellee.
ATTORNEY FEES
The Appellee, through her attorney, and by her own written and in-court oral
statements represented to the trial court that she was entitled to reimbursement from the
appellant for certain dental and counseling expenses that she had already paid.
On these two issues, she prevailed. On the two additional issues the Appellee
had brought before the court within her OSC, she did not prevail. Based upon this
partial "prevail" by the Appellee, the court awarded her one half of her attorney's fees.
However, the court's factual determination that the Appellee had paid the
expenses for which she was seeking reimbursement prior to June, 2001, was based
solely upon the representations made to the court by the Appellee and her attorney.
It turned out several months later, when documentation was finally produced by
the Appellee, that these representations to the court had been completely false.
Therefore, the factual determinations made by the court based on these false
representations by the Appellee were clearly erroneous.
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This court has ruled that the trial court's factual determinations are clearly
erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, State v. Bobo,
803 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990).
Here, the payment record produced by the Appellee which clearly shows she
never made the claimed payments until September, 2002, makes the two determinations
upon which the award of attorney's fees were based in conflict with the clear weight of
the evidence. Therefore, the award of the attorney's fees to the Appellee must be
reversed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court used the best information available to it to make determinations
concerning the reimbursement of certain dental and counseling expenses and the award
of attorney's fees to the Appellee. The court wisely did not blindly accept the Appellee's
claims of payment of the expenses, but rather directed her to provide the Appellant with
documentation of these claimed payments.
But then, the trial court abused its discretion when, over the objection of the
Appellant, it entered an order proposed by the Appellee's attorney without ever having
seen the required supporting documentation.
Now, many months later, the supporting documentation has been produced. This
documentation clearly shows the Appellee did not tell the truth in June, 2001, and does
not now deserve a judgment for reimbursement of expenses she has never paid, nor the
attorney's fees that she obtained by misleading the trial court.
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REQUEST FOR COSTS
The Appellant has been required to expend substantial funds to acquire the
transcript in this matter and draft this brief. All of these costs were a direct result of the
Appellee's dishonesty in her representations to the trial court. Justice mandates that the
appellant should not be the person to bear the costs of the Appellee's dishonesty.
Therefore, he asks this court to award him the attorney's fees he has incurred in this
appeal and any other costs or legal fees the Court deems fair.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON THIS V

* Day February, 2003.

>M&—

Gary Buhler
Attorney for Terry Larsen, Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this

n> day of February, 2003,1 served a copy of the

forgoing document, by depositing a true and correct copy thereof in the United States
Mails, addressed to:
Rose Blakelock
Blakelock & Stringer
305 East 300 South
Provo UT 84606
Gary Buhler
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GARY BUHLER (7039)
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
PO BOX 229
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029-0229
TELEPHONE: (435) 840-0555
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONNIE S. LARSEN
Petitioner,
vs.

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER C
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Case No. 954401254

TERRY J. LARSEN
Respondent.

Judge Harding Jr. Div. #6

Terry Larsen by and through his attorney Gary Buhler, hereby objects to the
proposed order on Order to Show Cause concerning a hearing held before the Court on
June 29, 2001, as follows:
1. The proposed order does not mention that the respondent requested an evidentiary
hearing in order to establish the cosmetic only versus the medical necessity of the
orthodontic treatments received by three of the parties' children.
2. The proposed order does not mention that the Court denied the respondent's request
for an evidentiary hearing.
3. The proposed order does not mention that the Court found that in this day and age, all
children are entitled to straight teeth, therefore the Court found that the orthodontic
treatments received by three of the parties' children were a non-routine dental expense

00*

for which the respondent is obligated to pay one half pursuant to the terms of the
divorce.
4. The proposed order does not mention that the respondent claimed the petitioner had
violated various provisions of UCA 78-45-7.15(7) in that she was claiming a judgment
for medical expenses that had not yet been paid and she had not reported various
medical expenses to the respondent until many months after the treatment was
received.
5. The proposed order does not mention that the Court found that UCA 78-45-7.15 was
not applicable to this matter because the divorce was entered prior to effective date of
the statute.
6. The proposed order does not mention that the respondent objected to the expense
claim related to the parties' child's use of controlled substances that resulted in court
ordered counseling in lieu of afineclaiming this was not a non-routine medical
expense.
7. The proposed order does not mention that the Court found that said court ordered
counseling for the parties' miner child was a non-routine dental expense for which the
respondent is obligated to pay one half pursuant to the terms of the divorce.
8. The proposed order does not mention that the respondent made a claim to the Court
that he should receive from the petitioner one half of the insurance premiums he had
paid for the parties' children.
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9. The proposed order does not mention that the Court denied the respondent's claim for
one half of the $132.00 he had been paying monthly for the parties' children's medical
insurance.
10. The proposed order states that "The respondent shall immediately pay to the petitioner
one-half of the costs of for the orthodontia, upon the Petitioner's providing verification
of the costs to the Respondent." Respondent believes that the order of the Court did
not include the words "immediately pay" and did include the requirement that the
petitioner furnish to the respondent receipts for payments actually made by the
petitioner on behalf of the parties' children within 10 days of the hearing.
11. It should be noted that the respondent's attorney did not receive the proposed order in
the mail until September 4, 2001, more than 60 days following the hearing on this
matter.
Wherefore, the respondent asks the Court to delay entry of the Order until the proposed
order includes mention of all of the issues raised by the parties and all of the findings made
by the Court in this matter.
Dated this September 5, 2001.

~ y^
Gary Buhler
Attorney for the Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
A true and correct copy of this document was served upon the petitioner by
placing same in the US Mail on September 5, 2001, postage paid, addressed to:
Rose Blakelock
Blakelock & Stringer
305 East 300 South
Provo UT 84606

•^H^Gary Buhler

«t

.-'I LED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
|P!\1P\

\9(t> Deputy

Rosemond Blakelock #6183
Attorney for Petitioner
305 East 300 South
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 375-7678
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601
CONNIE S. LARSEN (Thomas),
Petitioner,
v.

*
*

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

*

TERRY J. LARSEN,

*
*

Respondent.

Case No. 954401254
Judge Ray M. Harding

*

This matter came before the Court as for hearing on the 29th
day of June, 2001, before the Honorable Ray M. Harding.

Present

was the Petitioner and her counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. The
Respondent was also present and represented by counsel, Gary
Buhler. The Court heard the arguments and proffers of both
counsel, examined the file and the contents therein and deeming
itself to be fully informed in the premises, orders and rules as
follows;

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
1. The Court finds that Petitioner spent $5,563.00

as for

orthodontia for parties minor children and that the Respondent is
obligated to pay for one-half of the costs as for the orthodontia
for the parties' minor children, or the sum of $2,780.75. The
Respondent shall immediately pay to the Petitioner one-half of
the costs of for orthodontia, upon the Petitioner's providing
verification of the costs to the Respondent.

A judgment shall

enter as for the Respondents' one-half share of the orthodontia,
in the amount of $2,780.75.
2.

The Court denies the Petitioner's request for a judgment

as for insurance costs.
3. The Court grants the Petitioner a judgment as for onehalf of the counseling costs for the minor child, in the amount
of $337.50. Petitioner shall provide verification to the
Respondent that the amounts not covered by insurance totaled
$675.00.
4. The Court grants the Petitioner a judgment, in the amount
of $244.75,

as for one-half of the reasonable attorneys' fees
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incurred in bringing the matter before the Court.

SIGNED AND dated this __/ day of

(y£j

•

BY THE COURT:

, 2001

\QMALip.

*<%ZS£0*Py
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4-504 NOTICE TO RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL;
Gary Buhler, P.O. Box 229 Grantsville, Utah 84029-0229

You will please take notice that he undersigned attorney for
Petitioner will submit the above and foregoing Order to the
Honorable Judge Ray M. Harding, for his signature, upon the
expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus
three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed
prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of
Judicial Administration of the State of Utah.
DATED thi

day of August, 2001.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this ^ W t h day of August, 2001, I mailed a copy of the
Order to GaryH3*K\ler, at the above listed address, via first
class mail.

Statement of Account
Utah County Human Services
100 E Center Suite 3300
Provo,UT 84606-3106

p~ Account MQ.^

msn?

CL3394
Connie Thomas
165 W. Oak Drive
Woodland Hills, UT 84653

Date
03/16/2000
03/31/2000
04/04/2000
02/05/2001
04/28/2000
09/12/2002
05/10/2000
05/17/2000
05/17/2000
05/18/2000
05/24/2000
05/24/2000
05/25/2000
05/31/2000
05/31/2000
05/31/2000
05/31/2000

For
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad

WBioM:^
09/12/2002

Description
Placement Evaluation
Amount covered by Utah County
Individual Therapy
Insurance Payment
Urine/Drug Screen
Patient Payment-Check
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Individual Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Behavior Management
Individual Therapy
Individual Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Behavior Management
Amount covered by Utah County

Ref
13136
13136
18535
18535
18535
18535
18748
18748
18748
18748
18748
18748
18748
18748
18748
18748
18748

Charges

Credits

80.00
-80.00
65.00
0.00
10.00
-75.00
35.36
26.52
35.36
97.50
35.36
44.16
65.00
16.25
35.36
44.16
-335.03

»0,-.30£)ays,i
fMjGurrej

Notes
If you have any questions about this bill or believe your insurance should have been billed for these
services, please call our accounting office at 370-8562.
If your insurance is currently being billed, these charges might not accurately reflect total charges

Statement of Account
Jtah County Human Services
00 E Center Suite 3300
>rovo,UT 84606-3106

paccBunrMll

JRage1£

CL3394
:onnie Thomas
65 W. Oak Drive
Voodland Hills, UT 84653

ate
t/2002
72000
72000
1/2000
72002
/2000
/2000
/2000
/2000
/2000
/2000
/2000
/2000
/2002
/2000
/2000
/2000

For
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad

09/12/2002

Description
Patient Payment-Check
Individual Therapy
Group Therapy
Amount covered by Utah County
Patient Payment-Check
Individual Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Urine/Drug Screen
Amount covered by Utah County
Patient Payment-Check
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Individual Therapy

Ref
18748
18953
18953
18953
18953
20612
20612
20612
20612
20612
20612
20612
20612
20612
20771
20771
20771

Charges

Credits
-100.00

65.00
35.36
-0.36
-100.00
65.00
35.36
35.36
35.36
35.36
35.36
10.00
-151.80
-100.00
35.36
4.42
65.00

fotes
If you have any questions about this bill or believe your insurance should have been billed for these
services, please call our accounting office at 370-8562.
If your insurance is currently being billed, these charges might not accurately reflect total charges

Statement of Account
Utah County Human Services
100 E Center Suite 3300
Provo.UT 84606-3106

"pAbgountN^
CL3394

Connie Thomas
165 W. Oak Drive
Woodland Hills, UT 84653

Date
08/09/2000
08/09/2000
08/10/2000
08/15/2000
08/15/2000
08/15/2000
08/17/2000
08/22/2000
08/22/2000
08/24/2000
08/29/2000
08/31/2000
09/12/2002
09/06/2000
09/06/2000
09/06/2000
09/14/2000

Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad

V - i & t f i . ' * * » • - « • * » : +*Z <

saEssIDate-m^
09/12/2002

Description

For

ms

Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Individual Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Individual Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Individual Therapy
Group Therapy
Amount covered by Utah County
Patient Payment-Check
Individual Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Individual Therapy

Ref
20771
20771
20771
20771
20771
20771
20771
20771
20771
20771
20771
20771
20771
21270
21270
21270
21270

Charges

Credits

35.36
35.36
65.00
35.36
35.36
35.36
65.00
35.36
35.36
65.00
35.36
-482.66
-100.00
65.00
70.72
35.36
65.00

1
l3M60;Daysj ^gpDaysf, 9 1 ^ 2 0 T ) g y l
fC-urrentJ *'

East Due;**

Notes
If you have any questions about this bill or believe your insurance should have been billed for these
services, please call our accounting office at 370-8562.
If your insurance is currently being billed, these charges might not accurately reflect total charges

v>

Statement of Accouni
Utah County Human Services
100 E Center Suite 3300
Provo.UT 84606-3106

lAccountNtfid

%mm

CL3394
Connie Thomas
165 W. Oak Drive
Woodland Hills, UT 84653

)ate
4/2000
9/2000
1/2000
0/2000
2/2002
4/2000
4/2000
4/2000
1/2000
1/2000
6/2000
3/2000
0/2000
0/2000
2/2002

For
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad

09/12/2002

Description
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Individual Therapy
Amount covered by Utah County
Patient Payment-Check
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Individual Therapy
Group Therapy
Group Therapy
Individual Therapy
Individual Therapy
Individual Therapy
Amount covered by Utah County
Patient Payment-Check

Ref
21270
21270
21270
21270
21270
23285
23285
23285
23285
23285
23285
23285
23285
23285
23285

Charges

Credits

35.36
35.36
65.00
-271.80
-100.00
35.36
35.36
65.00
35.36
35.36
65.00
65.00
97.50
-333.94
-100.00

fotes
If you have any questions about this bill or believe your insurance should have been billed for these
services, please call our accounting office at 370-8562.
If your insurance is currently being billed, these charges might not accurately reflect total charges

